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Abstract
This work analyses the role of asymmetry in beliefs for price dynamics in a cobweb
model with heterogeneous expectations and evolutionary selection of predictors. While
heterogeneous but symmetric beliefs result in the rational expectations equilibrium
price, the effect of asymmetry depends on whether predictors on one side or the other
of rationality have a larger support. A support skewed towards predictors that are
anchored to past prices can be destabilizing, and the interaction with the evolutionary
selection mechanism can lead to complex dynamics in prices; a support skewed towards
predictors that overshoot price changes leads instead to price stability, irrespective
of the underlying evolutionary dynamics. The design of the set of beliefs allowed to
compete on the market is thus crucial for the possible outcomes of the model. One could
interpret a skewed support in terms of sentiments, intended as one-sided systematic
biases in expectations.
Key words: expectations; heterogeneity; evolutionary dynamics; sentiments.
JEL classification: C62, D83, D84, E32.
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1 Introduction
This paper looks at the impact of asymmetry in agents’ beliefs distribution on equilibrium
outcomes in a cobweb economy with heterogeneous expectations and evolutionary selection
of predictors.
In their seminal paper, [4, Brock and Hommes (1997)] - B&H hereafter - show how
highly irregular price dynamics can emerge in a simple cobweb market where agents can
switch between rational and naive predictors. After defining the concept of an adaptively
rational equilibrium (ARE), where agents adapt their beliefs over time by choosing from a
finite set of different predictors according to a discrete logit model, they then show how, in a
simple cobweb model where agents can choose between rational (at a cost) and naive (free)
expectations, agents keep switching between these two predictors, leading to complex and
even chaotic price dynamics.
This paper characterizes the shape of the finite set of different predictors among which
agents can choose in terms of their forecast errors, and show that such shape is crucial for
the outcomes of the model. A symmetric beliefs space, precisely defined below, gives rise
to an equilibrium where prices are at their rational expectations equilibrium (REE) level,
while the outcome under an asymmetric set of predictors depends crucially on which side of
the rational predictor the set is skewed towards. Depending on this, prices can show either
smooth convergence to the REE value, or complicated dynamics of the type depicted in
B&H.
The fact that a symmetric beliefs space leads to rational aggregate expectations is not
surprising. The coexistence of individual heterogeneity and aggregate rationality was con-
templated since the onset of the rational expectations paradigm, with [11, Muth (1961)]
acknowledging such possibility, with the caveat:: "Allowing for cross-sectional differences in
expectations is a simple matter, because their aggregate effect is negligible as long as the de-
viation from the rational forecast for an individual firm is not strongly correlated with those
of the others." It will be shown in this paper that a key feature in heterogeneous expecta-
tions leading to aggregate rationality is the distribution of the forecast errors, rather than
their independence: if forecast errors are symmetric around zero, in aggregate expectations
are rational, and prices are at the REE level. If forecast errors are not symmetric, complex
price dynamics of the type reported in B&H can, but do not necessarily, emerge in a cobweb
1
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model. The side of the asymmetry becomes then crucial in determining admissible equilibria
of the model.
The analysis in this paper shows indeed that, depending on the side of the asymmetry,
the reduced form AR(1) coefficient on prices can be constrained in a region that makes prices
stable, or can be allowed to move from a stable to an unstable region, opening the door to
complex dynamics. As a logit model of evolutionary selection of beliefs based on forecast
errors (directly or indirectly, for example through profits) implies that the distribution of
beliefs preserves the same asymmetry as the set of available predictors, the characterization
of such set allows to understand whether complex dynamics can emerge or not in the model.
The asymmetry in the distribution of beliefs, and thus in forecast errors, interacts with
the negative feedback from expectations and determines prices: when there is a prevalence
of beliefs that are anchored to the past, such beliefs tend to be destabilizing, and the evolu-
tionary dynamics on predictors can lead to complex price dynamics. Beliefs that overshoot
price changes are, instead, stabilizing, so a set of predictors that forces aggregate beliefs to
show this property leads to stable prices, irrespective of the specific evolutionary dynamics
on beliefs induced by the logit model.
An important message that emerges from this analysis is that care has to be taken in
designing the support for predictors when employing evolutionary selection mechanisms on
beliefs, since this largely determines the outcomes that are admissible in the model. There
might be perfectly sound motivations for choosing a set of predictors that lead to forecast
errors more predominant one side or the other of rationality, for example if one aims at
capturing the idea of sentiments in beliefs, where aggregate expectations are systematically
overestimating or underestimating actual realized outcomes. In such cases, the evolution-
ary mechanism allows for heterogeneous beliefs dynamics while preserving the aggregate
sentiment.
1.1 Review of the literature
After being proposed in B&H, the concept of evolutionary dynamics on predictors has been
applied and extended in various directions in economics. For example, [2, Branch (2002)]
extends the original B&H analysis allowing for three types of beliefs: rational, naive and
adaptive expectations, while [6, Brock et al (2005)] introduce the concept of a large type
limit to study an evolutionary heterogeneous market system with many different strategy
types.
Within a cobweb model, [10, Hommes and Wagner (2010)] find that the rational ex-
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pectations steady state is eductively stable but not evolutionary stable when producers can
choose between three strategies: optimistic, fundamentalist and pessimistic. Building on
these results, [12, Naimzada and Pireddu (2020)] add rational producers in the market and
find that while rational agents enlarge the local stability region of the steady state, they also
lead to complex dynamics.
Evolutionary selection of beliefs and the ARE concept have also been used to study the
interplay of beliefs and outcomes in other economic settings besides the cobweb model. For
example, [5, Brock and Hommes (1998)] and ([9, Gaunersdorfer (2000)]) find similar com-
plex dynamics emerging in an asset pricing model, where the feedback from expectations
to prices is positive. Using similar mechanisms, [8, De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006)] find
complex dynamics in exchange rates and [7, De Grauwe (2011)] generates endogenous waves
of optimism and pessimism in a macroeconomic model. [3, Branch and MCGough (2016)]
find cycles and chaotic dynamics in a monetary model when traders switch between (costly)
rational and (costless) adaptive predictors and [1, Agliari et al. (2017)] propose an applica-
tion of the ARE concept to a New Keynesian macroeconomic model of inflation and output,
showing the impact of such beliefs dynamics on the stability and uniqueness of equilibrium.
None of these works seem to motivate the choice of the set of predictors made available to
agents in terms of the ensuing distribution of forecast errors, nor to discuss how such choice
is relevant for their results. It is the aim of this paper to address this issue.
2 A motivating example
As a motivating example for the analysis that follows, I consider the B&H framework with
two predictors and show simulations of price dynamics when the set of available predictors
is modified in two simple ways, by either adding or substituting one of the available options.
Rational and naive predictors could be represented, parsimoniously, as
pei,t = αipt−1 + (1− αi) pt, i = 1, 2 (1)
with α1 = 1, α2 = 0. The naive predictor is then characterized by α1 = 1 and the rational
one by α2 = 0. Consider now a third predictor, derived by setting α3 = −1. Agents using
this predictor would make the same forecast errors as those using α1, the naive agents, but
with a reversed sign. In fact, from (1)
εi,t = p
e
i,t − pt = αi (pt−1 − pt) ,
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so ε1,t = (pt−1 − pt) and ε3,t = − (pt−1 − pt): ex post, once pt is realized, forecast errors ε1,t
and ε3,t have the same size, but opposite sign. While naive agents undershoot price changes
in their forecasts, agents with a negative value for αi overshoot those changes (more on this
later), forecasting prices that are higher than actual ones when prices increase, and lower
than actual ones when they decrease.
Following B&H, I also assume the cost for using a naive predictor is zero, while there is
a positive cost for using the rational predictor. As the predictor characterized by α3 = −1
leads to forecast errors of the same size as those from the naive predictor, I also set their
cost to zero. It is equally costly to obtain forecasts with the same accuracy.
I then simulate the model under three different settings: i) the original B&H setting, with
only predictors characterized by α1 and α2 available; ii) a setting where all three predictors,
with α1, α2 and α3, are available; iii) a setting where only predictors with α2 and α3 are
available.
Starting with the B&H setting, I set all parameters as in the original work, in order to
replicate their Fig. 8.1 Results are shown in Figure (1), which in the top panel shows the
time series of prices, while in the bottom panel shows the reduced form AR(1) coefficient on
prices. Price dynamics replicate exactly those in Fig. 8 of B&H, top panel, where cycles in
prices emerge.
Keeping all parameters fixed, I then simulate the model under the two alternative scenar-
ios, first with three available predictors, characterized by αi = {−1, 0, 1} and then with two
options, characterized by αi = {−1, 0}. Results are reported in Fig 2 and Fig 3, respectively.
It can be seen that the behavior of prices is very different in these two cases compared to
the first one: with three predictors, prices drop immediately to their REE, remaining there
ever after; with two predictors, converge to the REE is instead smooth, but rapid, and once
again prices do not move from equilibrium once there.
The set of available predictors, thus, seems to have a major impact on the price dynamics,
and the aim of this work is to shed some light on the relationship between the two. In
particular, I will characterize the shape of the set of available predictors, how this impacts
on the distribution of beliefs and how such distribution determines the law of motion for
prices.
1Specifically, in terms of the model presented below, parameter values are set as follows: a = 0, z = 0.5;
b = 1.35; C = 1;β = 3.8, where β represents the "intensity of choice" parameter in the discrete logit model
for beliefs switching.
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Reduced form AR(1) coefficient in prices
Figure 1: Prices and AR(1) coeficient on prices. B&H setting.
predictors
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Reduced form AR(1) coefficient in prices
Figure 2: Prices and AR(1) coeficient on prices with three predictors: naive, rational and
contrarian.
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Reduced form AR(1) coefficient in prices
Figure 3: Prices and AR(1) coeficient on prices with two predictors: rational and contrarian.
3 The model
3.1 A cobweb model
In this section, following B&H, I derive a cobweb model with heterogeneous agents, where
firms need to decide how much to produce based on the expected selling price.
The profit function for a generic firm of type i (where the type will then represent the
predictor the firm uses) is specified as
πi,t = ptsi,t − c (si,t) , (2)
where πi,t are profits, pt is the selling price at time t and si,t is the quantity the firm produces





with b > 0.
As firms need to produce before knowing the selling price, maximizing expected profits




where pei,t is the expected selling price at time of production for a firm of type i. Aggregating
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where µi,t represents the relative number of firms of the same type.
Demand Dt is assumed linear in prices
Dt = a− zpt,
with a ≥ 0 and z > 0 parameters.
Putting together demand and supply, setting a = 0 for simplicity and defining B = −b/z,











Since B < 0, the cobweb model features negative feedback from expectations to outcomes:
higher expected prices mean higher production, which lowers actual prices. Under rational
expectations, there is only one equilibrium, pt = 0, for B 6= 1. For the non generic case
B = 1, instead, any pt is an equilibrium.
3.2 Expectations
In B&H, a large part of the paper is devoted to derive and characterize complex dynamics
for the case with two predictors available to firms, pe1,t = pt−1 and p
e
2,t = pt, with p
e
1,t cor-
responding to naive expectations and pe2,t to rational expectations (RE). Naive expectations
are free to obtain, while RE entail a cost C > 0. Firms switch between the two forecasting
rules based on profits, and the switching is modeled using a discrete logit model. In the
REE, the two predictors deliver the same (correct) forecast, pt = 0, though one at a cost.
B&H show that, under certain conditions (in particular, B < −1 and C high enough), cycles
and even chaotic dynamics can emerge in this setting.
The purpose of this work is to clarify the relationship between the available predictors
and market outcomes. As costs affect the relative selection of different predictors under
evolutionary schemes, an assumption needs to be made about their relative cost: I will
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model such costs as linear in the distance of each predictor from RE, but results are robust
to alternative choices.
In order to capture the range of different predictors available for selection, I model them
as a linear combination of past and current prices. Agents can thus choose among a finite
set of n predictors represented by
pei,t = αipt−1 + (1− αi) pt, i = 1, 2, ..., n. (4)
Each of the n predictors available is thus characterized by a different αi, with αi ∈ S ⊂ R.
Here S is the support interval for αi, defined as S = [−l, r] , r, l ≥ 1. The n values αi are
chosen to be equally spaced over S, with α1 = −l and αn = r.
2 Such modelling device allows
for a parsimonious parameterization of expectations. Care has to be taken, in designing
the space S, in case one wants to make sure the rational predictor is included among the n
available predictors.
Restricting S = [0, 1] forces expectations to be a convex combination of past and actual
prices, but there is no reason why agents should not be able to use a predictor which forecasts
a price outside this range.
A useful way to rewrite (4) is
pei,t = pt − αi (pt − pt−1) ,
which shows that positive values of αi lead to underestimation when prices are increasing
and overestimation when they are decreasing. Such beliefs are thus anchored by past values
and undershoot price changes, in both directions. A negative value for αi, instead, has the
opposite effect, giving rise to expectations that are "extreme", as they overshoot the direction
of movement of prices (up or down).
One can then write the forecast errors εi,t as
εi,t ≡ p
e
i,t − pt = −αi (pt − pt−1) .
An interesting empirical question that could help design the beliefs space of agents is
whether the sign of the forecast errors tends to be the same as that of (pt−1 − pt): that
is, whether or not people’s expectations tend to be anchored by current values and forecast
errors tend to fall predominantly on one side. In the absence of any such evidence, it would
be perhaps advisable to allow forecast errors to fall equally on either side of zero.
2Restricting l = 0, r = 1 and n = 2 leads to the B&H setting, where αi = {0, 1}.
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I then denote as µi,t the relative fraction of firms at time t using a specific predictor,
characterized by αi, with
n∑
i=1















µi,tαi (pt−1 − pt) (5)




































































µi,tαi. While parameters αi, i = 1, .., n, depend on the set of predictors made
available to agents, the fractions µi,t will depend on the evolutionary mechanism adopted.
Before looking at it, though, I will discuss briefly in the next Section the choice of modelling
predictors according to (4).
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3.3 Representing expectations
In this section I motivate the choice of representing different predictors, and thus expecta-
tions, according to (4) by looking at two different alternative representations of heterogeneous
beliefs that might seem more intuitive, but that would not be suitable for the analysis of
this paper. These two examples help clarifying the desirable properties that an expectations
representation should feature in studies where the interplay of beliefs and outcome is to be
analysed.
The main reason for modelling expectations according to (4) is that such representation
offers a parsimonious way to model a class of beliefs where the degree of rationality is
characterized by one parameter only and prices depend on the aggregation of heterogeneous
beliefs in the population.
One could, for example, think of modelling different predictors as
pei,t = pt + αi,
where αi would represent the forecast error for predictor i. Rational firms would then be
characterized by αi = 0. The problem with this representation is that individual forecast
errors (and the ensuing profits for a firm) would be exogenous and independent of price
movements, so there would not be any endogenous dynamics in the evolutionary selection of
beliefs. Moreover, prices would always be equal to the constant α/(1 − B), where α is the
aggregation of the (exogenous) individual forecast errors.
Another possibility would be to represent expectations according to
pei,t = αipt.
Rational firms would now be characterized by αi = 1, and forecast errors would be equal
to (αi − 1) pt. Now individual forecast errors do depend on price movements but, with this
specification, pt = 0, independently of agents’ beliefs. Price dynamics are thus trivial, no
matter what beliefs agents hold.
Neither of these representations, thus, would be suitable for a setting where one wants to
analyse the interplay of beliefs and outcomes. Of course, one can come up with an infinite
number of alternative representations, some of which might well offer useful insights, but I
believe that equation (4) offers a sensible and parsimonious way to think about the issues at
the core of this paper.
Beliefs asymmetry and price stability in a cobweb model
4 Evolutionary dynamics on beliefs
Having defined the set of predictors available to firms, it is now necessary to specify how
such predictors are selected. Following B&H, I assume that the fraction of firms using each
predictor i at time t, µi,t, is determined endogenously through a simple discrete logit model







π̃i,t = πi,t − C (αi) (9)
represents overall profits once the cost of using a certain predictor is accounted for. Next
period predictors are thus chosen according to their relative performance this period.
The last term in (9) represents the cost of using the predictor characterized by αi. As
said before, I model such costs as a linear decreasing function of the distance between αi and
0, which characterizes the RE predictor: the cost of a predictor, thus, increases (linearly)
with its degree of rationality, as, e.g., agents need to acquire and process more information
for it. In particular, the cost of the least rational predictor(s) available, characterized by
the largest αi in absolute value, is normalized to zero, and the cost of the rational predictor
(αi = 0) is fixed to the level C̄, that is C (max(l, r)) = 0 and C (0) = C̄:
3
















Using (4) to substitute out expectations and (6)-(7) to represent prices, and denoting ᾱ =
3Alternative cost functions, such as the quadratic one






could be assumed, and all results in this paper would hold. In general, any cost function that implies the
same cost for predictors with the same accuracy would lead to equivalent results.
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which shows that predictors characterized by the same |αi| lead to the same profits.
If one looks at mean squared errors, then, it can be seen that also the accuracy of forecasts





= α2i (pt−1 − pt)
2 (11)
= α2i (Ωt − 1)
2 p2t−1. (12)
Moreover, the accuracy of forecasts is monotonic and decreasing in |αi|, with a maximum at
the rational predictor (αi = 0).
The fact that two predictors with equal |αi| have the same performance, both in terms of
MSE and in terms of profits, justifies the idea of allowing predictors with both positive and
negative values for αi to coexist in the set of available options. For example, allowing the
existence of a predictor characterized by αi = −1 in addition to one with αi = 1 simply means
to allow agents to use a predictor with the same forecast error as the naive expectations,
only "on the other side" of rationality.
Equation (8) then implies that predictors generating the same profits (or the sameMSE)
are adopted by the same number of agents, for any finite value of β. Given that, as seen,
profits depend on the absolute value of the forecast error, two predictors characterized by
the same |αi|, if both available, will be adopted by the same fraction of firms at each time.
In other words, if the support of predictors is symmetric, so is the distribution of firms
adopting those predictors, and an asymmetric set of predictors translates into an asymmetric
distribution of firms, for any finite value of β.
While the size of the forecast errors depends on |αi|, their sign depends on the sign
of αi: a positive αi generates a negative forecast error if prices increase (i.e., prices are
underestimated) and a positive error if prices decrease (prices are overestimated), while
a negative αi leads to a positive error if prices increase (prices are overestimated) and a
negative error of prices decrease (prices are underestimated). A positive αi, thus, means
that expectations are anchored to past values (undershooting any price change), while a
negative one means they are overshooting price changes (in both direction).
For example, consider the set of predictors represented by αi = {−1, 0, 1}, which gen-
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{−∆p,t, 0,∆p,t}, with ∆p,t = pt − pt−1. In the first case p
e
1,t = −pt−1 + 2pt = pt + ∆p,t =
pt−1+2∆p,t: agents expect twice the change in prices that actually takes place. In the third
case, instead, pe1,t = pt−1 = pt − ∆p,t: agents’ forecasts miss out completely the change in
prices that is going to happen.
To sum up, a set of predictors {αi, i = 1...n}, chosen to be equally spaced over the closed
interval S ⊂ R, gives rise to a distribution of beliefs, through (8). As (8) gives equal weight
to predictors with the same |αi|, whether the distribution of beliefs is symmetric or not will
be determined by the shape of the set S.
5 Beliefs distribution and market outcomes
5.1 Symmetry and equilibrium
I now define precisely what is meant here by symmetry (and asymmetry) of beliefs or pre-
dictors and derive implications for price dynamics and equilibrium. As said before, the set
of available predictors gives rise to a distribution of beliefs in the economy through (8). As
predictors with the same |αi| imply forecast errors of the same magnitude, the distribu-
tion of beliefs will preserve the same (a)symmetry as that of the set of available predictors.
The notion of (a)symmetry can thus be applied equivalently to the set of predictors, to the
distribution of beliefs or to that of forecast errors.
Taking the rational predictor as the reference point, with a zero forecast error, symmetric
forecast errors in available predictors require that for any predictor characterized by αi = a,
a ∈ R+, a "mirror" predictor characterized by αj = −a is also available for selection. In
terms of the set S, this translates into the requirement l = r.
For any finite intensity of choice, β, a symmetric set S = [−l, r], l = r, translates into a
symmetric beliefs distribution, since any two predictors characterized by αi = a and αj = −a
are adopted by the same proportion of agents. It also gives rise to a symmetric distribution
of forecast errors, centered at zero.






It is clear that a symmetric distribution is characterized by λt = 0. It is also clear from (7)
that λt = 0 implies Ωt = 0 and thus, from 6, pt = 0. A symmetric distribution of beliefs thus
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leads to an aggregate expected price equal to its REE value, which is a stable fixed point of
the system.
Proposition 1 An heterogeneous expectations cobweb model with evolutionary dynamics
over predictors symmetrically distributed around the rational one is equivalent to an ho-
mogeneous, rational expectations cobweb model. The market is stable at the REE equilibrium
pt = 0.
From (8) and (13), it is clear that symmetry in beliefs is both a necessary and sufficient
condition for λt = 0, for any finite β. Since any predictor will be adopted by a strictly positive
fraction of agents, and this fraction is the same for any two predictors characterized by αi = a
and αj = −a, all pairs of terms where both αi = a and αj = −a are available cancel out:
the sign of λt is then characterized by those predictors (αi) for which a "mirror" counterpart
is not available. In other words, (8) imposes the same mass µi on beliefs with the same
absolute forecast error: their values will cancel out, and only forecast errors of predictors
that don’t have a counterpart will contribute to characterize aggregate expectations, and
thus price dynamics.
5.2 Asymmetry and dynamics
Having defined symmetry in beliefs, it is straightforward now to present the concept of an
asymmetric distribution of beliefs, arising from an asymmetric support set S with l 6= r.
If |l − r| is large enough compared to n, the largest interval between [−l, 0) and (0, r] will
include more predictors. In particular, this requires |l − r| > l+r
n−1
, which I will assume to be
always the case whenever l 6= r.4 In this case, then, λt 6= 0, with the sign of λt depending on
which side of rationality includes more predictors: beliefs are not symmetrically distributed
around the rationality and, in aggregate, expectations differ from the rational expectations
price.
According to (8), predictors characterized by the same |αi| will get chosen by the same
fraction of agents: if S is not symmetric around zero, there will be predictors on one side of
rationality that don’t have the corresponding predictor on the other side: since all predictors
are chosen by a positive fraction of agents for finite β, and predictors with the same absolute
value for αi get the same relative selection, the largest interval between [−l, 0) and (0, r],
4This assumption simplifies the exposition as it ensures that the largest interval includes at least one
more predictor, thus allowing to characterize the distribution of predictors in terms of the boundaries of set
S.
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including more predictors, will determine the overall sign of λt. In other words, forecast
errors are not equally distributed around zero, and so they don’t aggregate up to zero.
It is essential at this point to characterise the sign of λt and, through it, pin down
possible values for Ωt. Clearly, a positive λt means that there are more predictors available
with positive αi than with negative αi. The following Proposition lays out the ensuing
restrictions on Ωt and the induced properties of prices.




i. For l > r, λt < 0 and 0 < Ωt < 1: prices evolving according to (6) converge to their REE
value of zero over time.
ii. For l < r, λt > 0 and Ωt ∈ (−∞,+∞). Prices evolving according to (6) can display
complex dynamics under an evolutionary selection mechanism for beliefs like (8).
The proof is straightforward and goes as follows.
Noting that (8) determines the same µi,t for predictors characterized by the same absolute
value for αi, it is clear that all the terms in λt for which both αi = a and αj = −a exist
cancel out, and the sign of λt will depend on the relative size of l and r: if l > r, there will
be more terms with negative than with positive αi and λt < 0, while if l < r, positive terms
will instead dominate and λt > 0. We thus have two possible scenarios:
• Case 1: l > r =⇒ λt < 0.
If λt < 0 then 0 < Ωt < 1 (since B < 0, Bλt > 0, Bλt < (1−B (1− λt))) and prices
converge monotonically to zero, the REE equilibrium.
• Case 2: l < r =⇒ λt > 0.
When λt > 0, the characterization of Ωt is more complicated. First note that in this
case Bλt < 0. It it also trivially true that Bλt < (1−B (1− λt)), as the inequality
reduces to 0 < 1 − B, which is always satisfied in a cobweb model (B < 0). The sign
of the denominator in Ωt, though, cannot be characterized uniquely and two cases are
possible:
- Bλt < (1−B (1− λt)) < 0: then Ωt > 1 and prices are unstable.
- Bλt < 0 < (1−B (1− λt)) : then Ωt < 0, and prices could be stable or unstable,
depending on whether −1 < Ωt < 0 or not.
The alternating between stable and unstable regions for Ωt as µi evolves gives rise to
the irregular behavior described by B&H. In particular, when a large proportion of firms are
using the more rational predictors, the distribution of beliefs shifts closer to zero and λt takes
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on small positive values, determining small negative values for Ωt: price dynamics become
stable, inducing agents to adopt less rational predictors, thus increasing λt and driving Ωt
into the unstable region, with either Ωt < −1 or Ωt > 1, which in turn leads then firms to
switch to more rational predictors, and so on.
5.3 Discussion
Having presented Proposition 2, it is useful now to discuss some of its implications and delve
some more into the properties of the relationship between beliefs and prices, that is, of the
function Ωt (λt).
If λt < 0 then 0 < Ωt < 1 and prices converge monotonically to zero, the REE equilibrium.
In this case the evolutionary dynamics on predictors do not matter, as they preserve λt < 0
and thus price stability. The intuition is straightforward: when more firms use a predictor
characterized by a negative αi than by a positive αi, aggregate expectations overshoot any
price change. This means that when prices are decreasing, on average firms expect prices
to be lower than they turn out to be, which induces them to produce less, thus keeping
prices up. Similarly if prices are increasing, firms expect a larger rise than what actually
happens, thus increasing production and keeping prices low: again, prices are stabilized.
Due to the negative feedback on prices, expectations that overshoot price changes have a
dampening effect in a cobweb model, generating a contraction mapping on prices. The
evolutionary dynamics on predictors in this case do not matter, since λt remains negative
and thus 0 < Ωt < 1, no matter what the distribution of µi is.
One might wonder why this stable behavior is not found in B&H: the answer is that it
is explicitly ruled out by their assumptions A2 and A2’, which make the equilibrium price
p = 0 not stable and thus imply that Ωt must be greater than one in absolute value at p = 0.
Assumption A2 ensures such instability for the case where all costs C (αi) = 0, ∀αi, and
agents are uniformly distributed over the predictor space, with all fractions of agents fixed
at 1/n, while assumption A2’ ensures the instability when there are different costs and all
agents use the cheapest predictor. In both cases, a support of beliefs with l < r, which would
generate λt < 0 and price stability, is ruled out.
The second case, with λt > 0, is more complicated, and thus more interesting. For a
given cobweb model (that is, for a given B < 0), as λt increases (more firms adopting less
rational predictors) Ωt turns from a stable to an unstable region, first crossing the threshold
of −1, and then becoming positive and larger than 1.
As prices become unstable, more people will be driven to use a more rational predictor, so
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λt decreases towards zero and the system returns temporarily to stability with −1 < Ωt < 0.
As λt approaches zero (more and more firms use the more rational predictors, characterized
by values of αi close to zero, both positive and negative) and the price converges towards
its REE, the advantage of using the more rational, and more costly, predictors vanishes
and more and more firms start using the cheaper and less accurate predictors, leading λt to
increase once again. This is the B&H story of complex dynamics, and the intensity of choice
parameter β, determining the rate of switch among predictors, acquires now relevance in
determining these dynamics.
At this point, it is useful to investigate further the relationship between λt and Ωt, since
λt is characterized by the shape of the beliefs distribution and Ωt determines the dynamics





and it can be seen that there is a vertical asymptote at λt = 1−
1
B
, where Ωt tends to −∞

















Moreover, there is a horizontal asymptote at Ωt = 1: for λt → ±∞, Ωt → 1 from below











Fig. (4) depicts the relationship between and λt and Ωt.
It is also possible to determine the point where the system changes from stable to unstable:






















is thus the crucial point
where prices change from stable to unstable, and the switching back and forth across this
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Figure 4: Relationship between λt and Ωt.



















this means that as B takes on larger and larger negative values the system can be destabilized
for milder asymmetries in beliefs, while values of B closer to zero require stronger beliefs
asymmetries in order for the market to be destabilized.
Before concluding this discussion, a few words should be spent over the role played by the
intensity of choice parameter β. Such parameter is key for the complex dynamics depicted
in B&H, and it is clear from the above analysis that its key role is limited to the case where
λt > 0, as it governs the switch from a region of stability to one of instability for prices, as





. For a given set of available
predictors {α1, ..., αn}, in fact, the condition l < r ensures that λt > 0, but the precise
value of λt depends on the distribution of µi, which represent the weights on αi in λt, and
such distribution depends on β. The intensity of choice is instead irrelevant for the case
where λt 6 0, as the system is in this case stable for any dynamics on beliefs, i.e., for any
distribution of µi. In other words, changes in µi do not affect the sign of λt when l ≥ r
and thus Ωt remains constrained in the stable region 0 6 Ωt < 1 (with equality holding for
symmetric beliefs, i.e., λt = 0).
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5.4 Asymmetric support of predictors and sentiments
While a symmetric support for predictors allows agents to make forecast errors that fall
equally on both sides of zero, there might be valid reasons to assume that, in certain settings,
predictors falling on one side of rationality are more prevalent than those falling on the other
side. In particular, one could interpret an asymmetric support for beliefs as a way to capture
a prevailing sentiment in an economy, intended as one-sided systematic biases in expectations.
Evolutionary dynamics over an asymmetric support ensure that agents can switch predictors
over time, but the aggregate sentiment remains unchanged as it is determined by the shape of
the support set. Designing a skewed support S, thus, allows for a parsimonious way to model
sentiments in an economy, while allowing evolutionary forces to operate on the distribution
of predictors in the population.
Under this interpretation, in a cobweb model, bullish beliefs when prices are increasing
and bearish beliefs when prices are decreasing are stabilizing (this happens when λt < 0,
that is, l > r). The negative feedback from expectations to actual prices, in fact, ensures
that the overshooting in expected price changes has a dampening effect on price dynamics.
The evolutionary dynamics on predictors, then, capture the adjustment of individual beliefs,
within the aggregate sentiment defined by S.
On the other hand, when l < r, that is, when aggregate expectations are bullish at times
of decreasing prices and bearish when prices are increasing, sentiments are destabilizing if






coefficient on prices (Ωt) is between −1 and 0 and there is oscillatory convergence of prices





) the AR(1) coefficient is larger
than 1 in absolute value and prices become unstable. In this case, the evolutionary selection
of predictors, through (8), generates dynamics in λt that, interacting with actual prices, give
rise to the complex dynamics characterized in B&H, while preserving the general nature of
the sentiments.
6 Conclusions
Looking back at the motivating example in Section (2), one can now see that if there were,






, representing beliefs that are
rational, naive and half-way through the two, complex dynamics would still emerge. Indeed,
no matter how many predictors one includes with αi ∈ [0, 1], irregular dynamics in prices
would still emerge. On the other hand, if one allows enough predictors with forecast errors
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that fall on the other side of zero (that is, if one allows enough predictors with αi < 0),
then stable prices can obtain. The shape of the set of beliefs allowed to compete under
evolutionary dynamics is thus crucial for the outcomes of the model.
An essential element required in order to have cycles and complex dynamics in prices
in the original B&H work is the difference in cost among predictors: if the cost of using
different predictors is the same, in fact, the homogeneous equilibrium where all agents use
the rational predictor would prevail. In order to have irregular price dynamics, an unstable
homogeneous equilibrium is needed: since the fundamental equilibrium with rational agents
is always stable (see B&H, Theorem 3.1), costs need to be introduced in order to destabilize
it. But, as shown here, costs alone do not suffice to destabilize the market: one also needs a
set of available predictors skewed in one particular direction.
These results highlight the importance of the set of predictors, or heuristics, allowed to
compete under evolutionary schemes, as this determines the distribution of beliefs, which
in turns restricts possible market outcomes. A skewed support for beliefs could be intro-
duced, for example, with the purpose of capturing the idea of sentiments, where aggregate
expectations are tilted to one side or the other of the rational predictor, due to optimism or
pessimism of economic agents. Evolutionary forces then work on the skewed support, but
cannot change it, and thus the general behavior of the system is, to some extent, prede-
termined. Being aware of this link between available strategies and admissible outcomes is
important when employing evolutionary dynamics as a way to study the interplay of beliefs
and market outcomes.
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